Media: The War Israel Has Lost

The Middle-East war is fought in many fronts. While Israel has maintained its militarily superiority,  it’s been continuously defeated on the PR and Media fronts, which it tends to neglect.  The way the recent flotilla event was conducted PR-wise, is merely the tip of the iceberg of Israel inability to comprehend the importance of International Media and PR as a legitimate warfare strategy.  In this case, for instance, assuming that Israel needs to maintain the siege on Gaza, let’s see how it could have conducted a Media-savvy operation.

1.       In the months prior to the flotilla voyage, Israel could have preempted and published the identity of those passengers with links to Al-Qaeda and Hamas.  This would have made it apparent that the intentions of the Flotilla passengers were not necessarily peaceful.  It would have also made some of the genuine humanitarian activists on board reconsider the trip, as I believe that many of them were unaware of the terrorist affiliation of their crew mates.

2.       When the Flotilla neared Israeli water, all communication with the ship should have become public.  This would have made the non confrontational alternatives known. That is, that Israel didn’t object to the transportation of the humanitarian aid, and that the flotilla was welcomed to the Israeli port of Ashdod, where it would be inspected, and the cargo, accompanied by some of the flotilla’s members, would be shipped to Gaza by land. It would have also made it clear that sending in troops, was the last option, only after every other compromise had been declined by the ship.

3.       The preparation of the Flotilla passengers for violent confrontation should have also been broadcasted live, before the commando boarded the ship. After all, Israeli helicopters were flying above the ship and could easily have broadcast the violent intentions of the passengers.

4.       The Israeli commandos themselves should have made it visibly media-clear that their guns were paint-guns rather than real ones. Trying to fix the wrong perception after the event, once the public had made their mind, was predictably ineffective.

The result of confrontation with the Israeli professional army was known in advance. This leaves us to believe that the purpose of the confrontation was to be defeated, and thus score another win on the PR front. This is a war that Israel has been neglecting for too long, and must master, at least as much as it has mastered the military front.